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1 Appellate Court No. 9 00542 
1 Priority No. 16 
i. Appellate Court No. 90054 2 
i Priority No. 16 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Appellant, West Valley City, hereafter the "City" 
hereby responds to new matters set forth in the County's brief. 
Most new matters raised may accurately be termed "red herrings" in 
that they amount to little more than distractions from the primary 
issue before the Court in this case. The primary issue of law this 
Court has been asked to consider is whether the wording of §11-12-3 
Utah Code Ann. (hereafter §11-12-3) artificially extends the time 
at which the taxing boundaries change in the event of a municipal 
boundary change. 
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I. "Red Herrings" Raised by the County. 
A. Constitutional Challenge. 
The City does not challenge the constitutionality of §11-12-3 
nor is there a challenge to the Legislature's power to legislate 
taxation. The City simply asserts that the County's interpretation 
of that section is in error. The Legislature has not, through §11-
12-3, delayed the change in taxing boundaries of annexed territory 
previously within Municipal-Type Service District No. 1 to allow 
the District to retain taxes assessed and levied on property no 
longer within its boundaries. Without an express statutory grant 
of authority, the general rule is that the taxes assessed but 
uncollected as of the date of levy belong to the annexing or 
incorporating entity. 6 2 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations §7 9. West 
Valley City annexed the new territory far in advance of the date of 
assessment and levy for the tax year 1988 and should therefore have 
received the taxes for the provision of municipal services to the 
annexed territory. 
B. Administrative Inconvenience. 
The County attempts to impress this Court with the great 
administrative inconvenience of giving the tax dollars collected 
i 
for municipal services to the annexing or incorporating entity that 
must now provide the services. The City strongly disagrees with 
the County's unsubstantiated claims of having to adjust budgets, 
i 
valuations and rates for numerous taxing entities. There are only 
the three entities affected by the change, the County through its 
District and the City. The County is statutorily able to open its 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
budget for the purpose of reevaluation and adjustment during the 
budget year. §17-36-32(3), Utah Code Ann. If administrative 
inconvenience is a determining factor, the facts are equally 
oppressive on the City's side, in that under the County's 
interpretation of §11-12-3, the incorporating or annexing entity 
has to deliver services to a new territory without property taxes 
to pay for them. The extent of administrative inconvenience to 
both the City and County is factually disputed and should not be a 
determining factor in determining the question of law before this 
Court. 
C. Administrative Interpretation. 
The County further asserts that an administrative 
interpretation given to §11-12-3 over the years is evidence that 
they ought to be permitted to retain the taxes from newly 
incorporated or annexed territory though they no longer provide 
those services which are now required of the acquiring entity. The 
County misapplies the cases cited in their brief in support of this 
proposition. Administrative practices may be a consideration when 
ambiguity exists in the statute. In the present case the statutory 
provisions of §11-12-3 are express. Only the County's 
interpretation of that section may be termed "ambiguous" since it 
is based on implications and conjecture and not the plain wording 
of that section. Notwithstanding, the number of new incorporations 
and annexations in this State have been few and the resulting 
distribution of tax dollars cannot be said to have created an 
administrative practice contrary to the express wording of §11-12-
3 
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3. If such an error in administrative interpretation has occurred, 
the City now asks this Court to correct the error. 
D. The City's Control Over Boundary Changes., 
The County also erroneously asserts that the City has control 
over boundary changes and receives tax dollars from other sources 
and, therefore, little harmed by the County's retention of tax 
dollars needed to service the new territory. Once again, this is 
not an issue relevant to obtaining an accurate interpretation of 
§11-12-3. Notwithstanding, the County is far from accurate. The 
creation and expansion of City boundaries is governed by State law. 
The incorporation of a city is, by statutory mandate, complete on 
July 1 of a given year. Since notice, pursuant to §11-12-1, must 
be filed after the boundary change is complete, under the County's 
interpretation of §11-12-3, a newly incorporating city is never 
able to receive tax dollars for the year in which it is 
incorporated. Also, §10-2-415, Utah Code Ann., requires that a 
developer developing within one half mile of the City's boundaries 
apply for annexation. Under the County's interpretation of §11-12-
3, the City would have to stall development off until December when 
it could annex without loss of property tax dollars. In these 
cases "development," not the City, determines the date of 
annexation. If the Legislature* intended the interpretation of §11-
12-3 that the County proposes, they failed to provide for these 
significant contingencies. 
The above issues, though informative, should not be permitted 
to cloud the issues of law before this Court. Does §11-12-3 
4 
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prohibit ad valorem taxation by cities of property within their 
physical boundaries for municipal services they must provide and 
consequently, is the County entitled to retain those taxes for 
services it does not provide? 
II. THE COUNTY'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 
11-12-3, UTAH CODE ANN. , VIOLATES RULES 
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
A. Statute Must Be Given Its Literal Meaning. 
The County contends that §11-12-1 is a comprehensive and 
exclusive process by which political subdivisions may be 
incorporated, established or the boundaries thereof modified and 
that these provisions provide for change of boundary for ad valorem 
tax purposes at a later period of time than the actual physical 
occurrence of the boundary change. Such an assertion and 
interpretation is in direct contradiction of the basic principles 
of statutory construction set forth by this Court in governing 
taxation. Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
796 P.2d 1256 (1990). In that case this Court established a rule 
of statutory construction important to the current case: 
A second rule of statutory construction 
mandates that a statute be read according to 
its literal wording unless it would be 
unreasonably confusing or inoperable. It is 
presumed that a statute is valid and that the 
words and phrases used were chosen career-lly 
and advisedly. Id. at page 1258. 
The County erroneously reads part of §11-12-1 out of context 
by combining those provisions with the provisions of §11-12-3 to 
create new law. The County takes the first sentence of §11-12-1 
which states: 
5 
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No county service area, special purpose 
district, city or town may be incorporated, 
established, or the boundaries modified, 
without notification of the change being filed 
with the State Tax Commission within 10 days 
after the conclusion of the proceedings in 
connection with the change. 
and combines it with the independent provision of §11-12-3 which 
states: 
Property annexed to any existing taxing entity 
of property in any new taxing entity shall 
carry any tax rate imposed by that taxing 
entity, as required by Section 11-12-1, is 
made to the Tax Commission not later than 
December 31 of the previous year. 
They now interpret these two sections as reading that no 
boundary change for the purpose of taxation may occur until the tax 
year following the annexation unless notice is given before 
December of the previous year. This Court has firmly determined 
that a statute must be read according to its literal wording, 
unless it would be unreasonably confusing or inoperable. Section 
11-12-1 specifically provides that a boundary is complete after 
notifying the State Tax Commission within 10 days after the 
conclusion of the proceedings in connection with the change. West 
Valley City lawfully completed this requirement on March 31 of the 
tax year in question. At that time, all legal requirements for a 
boundary change were met, the annexation became final and the 
boundaries were changed for all purposes including ad valorem 
taxation. Section 10-2-415(4)(b)1 and §11-12-1, Utah Code Ann* 
x0n filing the maps or plats, the territory annexed is part of 
the annexing municipality, and the inhabitants of the annexed 
territory shall enjoy the privileges of the annexing municipality. 
6 
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The issue of boundary change being addressed, the Legislature 
next made provision for determining which "tax rate" would apply to 
the annexed area, but made no statement which would grant power to 
the County to tax the newly annexed area even though it was 
physically within the City boundaries. Section 11-12-3 provides 
that without the required notice, the new entity cannot apply its 
own tax rate. The literal wording of this section only addresses 
the "tax rate" to be applied. It does not address the matter of 
who may levy the tax, either expressly or by implication. This 
determination is governed by the "general rule" that where the 
property is located on the date of levy determines which entity 
will receive the tax. Other provisions of the Code are in harmony 
with that principle. The express provisions of the enabling 
legislation governing Municipal-Type Service District No. I2 
expressly provide for the levying of a tax only on territory within 
district boundaries. No special distinction is made between actual 
physical boundaries and boundaries for ad valorem taxation 
purposes. 
The Legislature makes no reference to §11-12-3 in the enabling 
provisions governing Municipal Type Service District No. 1 to the 
2(1) Whenever a county furnishes the municipal-type services 
and functions described in Section 17-34-2 of this chapter to areas 
of the county outside the limits of incorporated cities or towns, 
the entire cost of the services or functions so furnished shall be 
defrayed from funds that the county has derived from either (a) 
taxes which the county may lawfully levy or impose outside the 
limits of incorporated towns or cities, or (b) service charges or 
fees the county may impose upon the persons benefitted in any way 
by the services or functions, or (c) a combination of these 
sources. 
7 
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artificial extension of its boundaries for the purposes of ad 
valorem taxation in the event of a boundary change. That is a 
fiction created by the County. The plain wording of those sections 
presently provide for the levy of taxes upon those areas within the 
boundaries of the special district and make no reference to the 
extension of boundaries for ad valorem taxing purposes. When the 
service district provides municipal services it may defray its cost 
from funds derived from: 
(a) taxes which the county may lawfully levy or impose 
outside the limits of incorporated towns or cities 
§17-34-3, Utah Code Ann. (Underline added). 
The principle rule of statutory construction identified above 
operates on the presumption that "... a statute is valid and that 
the words and phrases used were chosen carefully and advisedly. " 
M a x at Page 1258. At the date of levy,, the territory annexed was 
entirely within the municipal boundaries of West Valley City. The 
Service District cannot levy a tax outside its boundaries. 
B. Mandatory Language Necessary to Sustain the County's 
Interpretation of §11-12-3 is Missing. 
A second important rule of statutory construction in tax 
matters was provided by this Court in Kennecott Copper Corporation 
v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978). The County 
incorrectly claims that the requirements of §11-12-3 were mandatory 
conditions precedent to the City's ability to tax. The language of 
§11-12-3 does not meet the Court's requirements for imposing 
mandatory conditions on the City. In Kennecott Copper/ this Court 
made a determination of whether the provisions of two statutes that 
8 
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use the words "must" and "shall" were directory or mandatory. Utah 
Code Annotated, §59-9-6.3 (1953) provided: 
The board of county commissions of each county 
must levy a tax on taxable property of the 
county between the last Monday in the seventh 
month and the second Monday in the eighth 
month . . . 
Utah Code Annotated, §17-36-31 provided that: 
On or before the second Monday in August of 
each year, the governing body shall levy a tax 
on taxable real and personal property . . . 
The Court held that those two statutes were directory and 
permitted Salt Lake County to set a new levy after the statutory 
date had passed- In reaching that holding, the Courts reasoned: 
Generally, those directions which are not of 
the essence of the thing to be done, but which 
are given with a view merely to the proper, 
orderly and prompt conduct of business, and by 
the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to 
those whose rights are protected by the 
statute, are not commonly considered 
mandatory. Likewise, if the act is performed 
but not in the time or in the precise manner 
directed by the statute, the provision will 
not be considered mandatory if the purpose of 
this statute has been substantially complied 
with and no substantial rights have been 
jeopardized. Id. at page 706. 
The Court also stated: 
The general rule is that a statute prescribing 
the time within which public officers are 
required to perform an official act, is 
directory only, unless it contains negative 
words denying the exercise of the power after 
the time specified of the nature of the act to 
be performed, or the language used by the 
legislature shows that the designation of time 
was intended as a limitation . • • . Id. at 
page 706. (Emphasis added). 
9 
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The focus of the Court in making this determination was 
whether or not the purpose of this statute was to protect the 
taxpayer: 
On the other hand, where the purpose of the 
statute is not to protect the taxpayer, but 
merely to set up a guide for the tax 
officials, a provision as to time when an act 
is to be performed by a tax official or board 
is ordinarily construed to be merely 
directory, especially where there are no 
negative words in the statute that the act 
shall not be done at any other time. Id. at 
page 706. 
Thus, notwithstanding the use of the words "must" and "shall", 
the Court concluded that these two statutes were directory because: 
The time provisions appear consistent with a 
legislative purpose to establish a guide for 
the orderly and prompt conduct of the public 
business. Furthermore, there are no negative 
prohibitions in the statutes as to time or 
performance. Finally, the purpose of the 
statute is not to protect the taxpayer, viz., 
to give him notice or an opportunity for a 
hearing. Id. at page 706 and 707. 
Similarly, the provisions of §11-12-3 are directory because 
the statute was not enacted to protect taxpayers, nor is the 
statute drafted in the negative, prohibiting the act of levying 
taxes unless timely notification is made. The logical purpose of 
the above statute is to facilitate the prompt and orderly conduct 
of public business by establishing a guide for the notification and 
recording of the transfer of property from one taxing jurisdiction 
to another. The language of §11-12-3 is not mandatory. Therefore, 
as long as a tax assessment and levy are made while property is 
within an entity's territorial jurisdiction, the assessment and 
levy is valid. 
10 
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The County has argued that the use of a County tax rate, if 
proper notice is not given under §11-12-3, is fraught with 
uniformity, truth-in-taxation and other problems. While the City 
believes these concerns are unfounded, the above rule provides a 
consistent, alternative argument regarding interpretation of §11-
12-3. Where the County proposes that §11-12-3 is a mandatory 
prerequisite to taxation, the City, due to the above rule, would 
assert that the language is directory only in that the City's 
failure to comply with the provisions of §11-12-3 do not take away 
its power to tax those properties found within its boundaries on 
the date of levy. Under the above rule, the City may impose its 
own tax rate and levy a tax against properties found within its 
boundaries upon the date of levy. Since the date of annexation was 
far in advance of the date of levy in the instant case, the City 
may lawfully levy a tax at its own rate for the municipal services 
it must provide to the new territory. 
At the very least, the express language of §11-12-3 does not 
extend the time for inclusion of the new territory within the 
boundaries of the City and authorize the County to tax 
extraterritorially. §11-12-3 provides a guide for the orderly and 
prompt conduct of public business. There is no negative 
prohibition as the time for performance and the purpose of the 
statute is not to protect taxpayers. 
The express provisions of §11-12-3 do not take away the City's 
power to tax, nor does it authorize the County to tax outside the 
physical boundaries of the service district. Numerous provisions 
11 
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throughout the Utah Code and Utah case law specifically prohibit 
taxation outside the physical boundaries of a taxing entity. Those 
same provisions and cases recognize the date of levy as the date at 
which power to tax is determined. As previously stated, §10-2-
415(4)(b) and §11-12-1 expressly provide that upon the filing of 
all plats and maps with the County Recorder and upon notice to the 
Tax Commission within 10 days after the date of annexation, the 
annexation is final for all purposes and the annexed territory is 
within the boundaries of the municipality. As indicated 
previously, the enabling provisions of the Special District Act, 
under which Municipal-Type Service District No. 1 was created, 
expressly provides only for tcixation for a levying of tax within 
its boundaries. (See footnote 2). Article XIII, §10 of the Utah 
Constitution3 also clearly recognizes the right of an entity to 
levy taxes only upon property within its boundaries. For almost 
100 years, numerous cases in the State of Utah have sustained the 
same principle. Huntington City v. Peterson, 518 P.2d 1246 (Utah 
1974), Utah Parks Company v. Iron County, 380 P.2d 924 (Utah 1963), 
Parry v. Bonneville Irrigation District, 263 P. 751 (Utah 1928), 
Gillmor v. Dale, 75 P. 932, 934 (Utah 1907). The County now 
insists that the statutory provision, §11-12-3, creates a fiction 
ignoring the physical change in boundaries and by changing the 
boundaries for ad valorem tax purposes at a later date. 
3All corporations or persons in this State, or doing business 
herein, shall be subject to taxation for State, County, School, 
Municipal or other purposes, on the real and personal property 
owned or used by them within the Territorial limits of the 
authority levying the tax. (Underline added). 
12 
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It is well established that upon boundary change, it is 
competent for the Legislature to provide for the disposition of 
municipal taxes uncollected as of the date of consolidation or 
annexation. In the absence of such a provision, taxes assessed on 
the annexed territory, but not collected as of the date of the 
annexation, belong to the annexing city. 62 C.J.S., Municipal 
Corporations §79. The County has not challenged the application of 
the above rule, but instead, insists that §11-12-3 is the 
Legislature's mandate providing for the disposition of the ad 
valorem taxes. In light of the above rule of statutory 
construction, however, the language the County refers to in §11-12-
3 for that proposition does not accomplish that. There is no 
express wording extending the time for boundary change for ad 
valorem tax purposes and there is no negative, mandatory language 
prohibiting the City from taxing if the December 31 deadline is not 
met. 
The rules of statutory construction prohibit the County from 
interpreting that section in the above manner. The City would 
respectfully request that the Court find that the language of §11-
12-3 is directory only, and that the City's failure to comply with 
that language does not prohibit the City's levying an ad valorem 
tax upon property within its boundaries upon the date of levy. 
III. THE COUNTY'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 
11-12-3 CREATES A DOUBLE TAX. 
If the County is correct, citizens of an annexing city must 
pay for services provided to citizens in the newly annexed area as 
well as to themselves. This was precisely the case in Salt Lake 
13 
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City Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 550 P.2d 1291 (1976). In 
referring to the provisions of §17-34-1, the same Code sections 
that govern Municipal-Type Service District No. 1, the Court 
stated: 
This statute was passed to remedy what is 
commonly known as "double taxation" which 
results when municipal residents are required, 
through county tax assessments, to finance 
services provided exclusively to residents of 
the unincorporated areas of the county. Id. 
at page 1292. 
In the present case, citizens in the newly annexed area must 
pay for municipal services provided exclusively to the 
unincorporated area of the County, At the same time, citizens of 
the annexing entity must bear the entire burden for providing 
municipal services to the new territory. In addition, if, as is 
often the practice, tax anticipation notes were issued for the 
provision of municipal services to the newly annexed territory, to 
defray the cost of municipal services by the newly incorporated 
city or annexing city, the citizens in the newly annexed or 
incorporated area would be required to pay a second time for the 
provision of municipal services for the year in which they were 
provided. The County's interpretation of §11-12-3 works as a 
double tax on both the citizsms of the annexing and/or newly 
annexed areas. 
IV. TRUTH IN TAXATION REQUIREMENTS ARE 
MET BY THE CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF 
SECTION 11-12-3. 
Truth-In-Taxation provisions of the Utah Code are not violated 
by the City's interpretation of §11-12-3. In the present case, 
14 
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under the City's interpretation of this section, the tax rate to 
the new territory would be either the same as the County's or at 
the lower City rate. The Services provided would not change. The 
only change would be the entity levying the tax. The property 
owners must, under the States annexation law, be given notice of 
the change in boundaries and therefore is aware to the change in 
taxing entity. If the tax rate will be greater than the rate of 
the annexing entity's, the process for notification is proscribed 
in the State Code. Section 59-2 Part 9 Utah Code Ann. The notice 
requirements of Truth-in-Taxation are met under the City's 
interpretation of §11-12-3. 
V. THE CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 11-
12-3 COMPLIES WITH UNIFORMITY 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Uniformity of taxation provisions of the Utah Constitution are 
not violated by the taxation of the newly annexed area by the City, 
at either its own rate or at the County's rate. If, pursuant to 
the rules of construction arguments made in Argument II B above, 
the City used its own tax rate, the County would not have any 
uniformity argument since the new area would be taxed at the same 
rate as all other properties in the City. The City, however, takes 
issue with the County's understanding of uniformity. Article XIII, 
§2(1) states: 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under 
this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform 
and equal rate in proportion to its value, to 
be ascertained as provided by law. 
15 
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As has been properly stated by the County in their brief, the 
Legislature governs ad valorem taxation by "general law". Article 
XI, §35, Utah Constitution. The uniformity provisions of the 
State's Constitution specifically impose upon the Legislature the 
responsibility of complying with the intent of this section when 
dealing with taxation. It does not, however, presume to 
specifically instruct the Legislature on how to do this. It is 
well established that the intent of uniformity provisions, such as 
the one this State's Constitution, are meant to preclude double 
taxation and unreasonable and unjust discrimination. 
16 McQuillans, Municipal Corporations, Taxation §44.19. 
The Legislature, in dealing with the difficult problem of "tax 
rate" in the event of a boundary change, enacted §11-12-3. This 
section reasonably provides that the newly annexed property will 
not be taxed at its own tax rate unless the required notice is 
given. The obvious question is, which tax rate then applies? If 
the County's understanding of uniformity prevails, the City must 
look at the provisions of §11-12-3 as being directory only and 
apply its own tax rate notwithstanding that direction. If the 
City's understanding prevails, the County's rate will be applied. 
In either case, the City is the entity levying the tax. The County 
may not levy a tax. 
The City asserts that the Legislature, by enacting §11-12-3, 
has eliminated the possibility of double taxation and does not 
unjustly discriminate in taxing the newly annexed area at the same 
rate as surrounding properties though the taxing boundaries change. 
16 
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It is well recognized that government's ability to deal with 
taxation is not always going to result in precise equality. The 
intent of a uniformity clause is to prevent the arbitrary and 
unreasonable acts of government in this regard and not to prohibit 
the reasonable attempts of government to provide for such 
contingencies as a change in boundary. The Legislature's treatment 
of the tax rate to be applied upon annexation does not violate the 
uniformity provision of the Constitution, but instead, comports 
with the intent of that provision• 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the focus of this appeal centers on an 
interpretation of §11-12-3. The City's position is that this 
section refers only to the tax rate that must be applied to newly 
annexed territory and that the language is merely directory and not 
mandatory. The legal arguments in favor of the City's 
interpretation are sound. Notwithstanding, the fairness of the 
City's position must also be considered. It is not fair to require 
the City and its tax payers to provide municipal services to a 
newly annexed area and at the same time, fail to provide funding 
for it to do so. Neither is it fair to bestow upon the County, a 
windfall of tax dollars for municipal services they no longer 
provide to the annexed area. The County has created a fiction by 
their interpretation of §11-12-3 that does both of these things. 
The City respectfully requests that this honorable Court determine 
that the wording of §11-12-3 determines only which tax rate applies 
and that the language of that section dealing with notice, is 
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directory and not mandatory and does not artificially prevent a 
boundary change for ad valorem tax purposes until the next tax 
year. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 199, 
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